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Denial is their only plan of defense. Name calling and redirection their only tool.
Must Read This. Site is still under Development, but still a good read.
Democracy is based on four key elements – free and fair elections, the active participation of citizens in politics and civic life, the protection of human rights, and the upholding of the rule of law.
By ensuring all citizens are treated equally, the rule of law prevents discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnic group, or gender. With an independent judiciary to ensure that no-one – not even a monarch or elected ruler – is above the law, upholding the rule of law is a safeguard of crucial importance for the citizens of any modern democracy.
This week’s NZCPR Guest Commentator, Judge Anthony Willy – a retired District Court Judge and former Canterbury University Law Lecturer – has examined the state of the rule of law in New Zealand and shares his concerns. In his briefing paper, Privilege and the Rule of Law, Judge Willy explains that nothing is more important to the preservation and enjoyment of the freedoms we take for granted than the protection of the Rule of Law:
“The purpose of this brief and of necessity incomplete excursion into the constitutional significance of the Rule of Law is to examine the constitutional health of New Zealand in 2014, a country which any informed commentator will assert pays careful attention to the observance of the Rule of Law. We certainly have all of the trappings: a democratically elected Parliament with universal franchise, a strong Judicial tradition, the members of which enjoy guaranteed tenure, and are independent of Parliament and the Executive, the process of judicial review by which the decisions of officials and Parliament can be tested for legality and due process, a Bill of Rights which enshrines all of the content of the rule of law in unambiguous terms. So it would appear that constitutionally all is rosy in this garden of ours.
“And so it is with one worrying exception and that is the growing trend in some areas of public policy towards preferring the economic and civil rights of Maori people above those of non Maori, for no better reason than their ethnicity. No other ethnic group is seeking privileges not available to all, but the same arguments would apply if one should emerge.”
He argues that while reverse discrimination initiatives introduced over the years in the name of improving Maori health, education, and welfare, have been widely accepted by the public, it is the more recent demands for the ownership and control of public resources – and the sharing of sovereign power – that are causing concern.
“Maori are embarked on making more and more strident claims to unequal treatment based solely on their ethnicity. Among the more worrying are: Claims of a political nature for example to share in the sovereignty of New Zealand,[i] claims to unelected representation as of right on a number of public bodies such as Regional and District Councils, claims to the right to occupy increasing areas of the fore shore and seabed to the exclusion of other members of society, claims to a rent from assets such as geo thermal steam, and increasingly to share in the value of river water where it is of some economic significance. There are also claims to intellectual property rights to vegetation which grows commonly in New Zealand, and to the air waves, on the basis these are treasures which are protected by the Treaty of Waitangi. These claims are facilitated by the growing trend towards provisions being inserted into plans prepared by regional authorities under the Resource Management Act giving emphasis to often vaguely worded Maori rights and claimed privileges.”[ii]
Judge Willy explains that, “The basis for these claims rests solely on the proposition that the claimants are to some extent of Maori descent. If successful therefore they are thus in clear breach of a fundamental component of the Rule of Law. If such claims are to be granted solely on the basis of race, then what next. No member of the society any longer has the protection of the equal treatment component of the Rule of Law, and as a concept regulating the conduct of the affairs of society The Rule of law is fatally compromised. The inevitable consequence is that New Zealand will cease to be a society in which the Rule of Law is paramount, to one in which race based privilege or some other criterion depending on which group is seeking the privilege, becomes the deciding factor in who gets what benefits from society, and what opportunities are open to whom.”
The never-ending demands by iwi and the continual appeasement by governments are clear indications that New Zealand’s political system has been captured by an interest group pushing for Maori supremacy. Fundamentally, Maoridom’s elite have persuaded politicians that their genetic inheritance guarantees them superior status to all other citizens. Dressed up as bogus claims of Treatypartnership and sovereignty rights, successive governments have knowingly compromised the rule of law by granting special privileges based on superior race demands.
This is extremely dangerous.
Corporate iwi are now claiming their genetic inheritance gives them the right to become a ruling class in New Zealand. They are demanding reserved seats so they can sit at the ‘top table’ alongside the government – without having to be elected. Yet reservedseats are an anathema to democracy – they not only undermine the rule of law, but they also corrupt the one-person-one vote principle on which our system of government is based.
In a 2010 speech, the Minister of Maori Affairs Pita Sharples, revealed a deep disdain for democracy, calling “one vote for one person” and “democratic elections”, “artificial political concoctions”. He explained that, “The Maori kaupapa were principles that promoted ‘equity’ and ‘inclusiveness’, surely the ideals of a ‘civilised’ society. We must begin to recognise that democracy has many expressions, many ways of mobilising voices and representation, rather than statically holding onto dominant axioms.”[1]
It is the long term aim of the Maori sovereignty movement to hold, not just one or two reserved seats on governing bodies, but 50 percent. Even though Maori represent a minor part of the population and the two race-based parties combined gained less than 3 percent popular support at the last election, in this post Treaty-settlement era, their crusade is for a half of governing seats to be determined by race for use by their appointed elite, with 50 percent for everyone else. In spite of the fact that such co-governancearrangements fly in the face of the rule of law and democracy itself, the government – both local and central – are already establishing such arrangements to control crucial public resources, such as the Waikato River, the Hauraki Gulf, and the Urewera National Park. The naked ambition of iwi driving this agenda (as submissions to the government’s constitutional review reveal only too clearly) is to set themselves up as a permanent ruling elite. By holding 50 percent of the votes on governing bodies, they can control the country by default. That government is playing along – threatening the integrity of the rule of law and democracy itself – is deplorable.
Unfortunately, while the public are increasingly alarmed by these developments, many elected representatives are supportive.
These issues reached a head in New Plymouth last week when the Mayor put forward a proposal to the 15-member District Council to appoint six iwi members with full voting rights onto influential council committees. He justified the proposal on the basis that “Iwi participation in local government is necessary because they’re our treaty partner”.[2]
Under the Local Government Act, councils are required to provide opportunities for Maori to contribute to the decision-making process. In most cases, local iwi have privileged status as an ‘affected party’ under the Resource Management Act, which means that councils will refer consents to them as a matter of course. Most councils also have liaison committees to ensure that local iwi are kept well informed, especially on issues involving submissions.
The problem is that many cash-rich iwi now want more. Being able to approve or block consents is no longer enough. They want decision-making rights – not through the normal democratic process, but through the back door.
The New Plymouth District Council vote showed five council members were in favour of race-based representation, while seven were opposed; three were absent. While the motion was defeated, the matter does not rest there.
Te Atiawa iwi representative Peter Moeahu threatened the council: “It is of grave concern when New Plymouth councillors deliberately act contrary to local government law and spit in the face of iwi, the Crown’s Treaty partner. The law is clear: Council has a legal obligation to engage with iwi. They refuse to do so. I am in Wellington next week and will raise this issue with government officials. I expect other iwi of north Taranaki may do the same.”[3]
After the move to appoint iwi onto the District Council was defeated, the Taranaki Regional Council chief executive Basil Chamberlain revealed that they too were planning to appoint iwi with full voting rights onto influential council committees. The chief executive explained that “the issue was still under discussion and would be confirmed when Treaty settlements went through”. [4] Council minutes from a meeting on March 18 stated, “It was noted … that the matter of Iwi representation on some standing committees of the Council was still being carefully worked through with Taranaki Iwi and will possibly be another twelve months before given effect to.”
The Local Government Commission, under the leadership of Basil Morrison (who is also a member of the Waitangi Tribunal) is now pushing a race-based agenda. In any area where amalgamation is being considered, the Commission is recommending super councils and Maori statutory boards. If the Commission tries to force through such changes against the will of residents and ratepayers, locals have an opportunity to fight back through region-wide referenda. However, if the Commission tries to force through its agenda against the widespread wishes of the public, then the Commission itself should be sacked – for failing to respect the views of locals and for undermining the rule of law.
Upholding the rule of law is crucial to democracy. This week we have launched a petition calling for the abolition of the Maori seats. The 1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System recommended the abolition of the Maori seats, if MMP was introduced. While strong advocacy by Maori leaders ensured the seats were retained, their existence – through Maori-only parties holding the balance of power – is now leading to an escalation of race-based laws and extremism, which is seriously undermining democracy and dividing our country. It is time race-based seats were removed, to strengthen the rule of law and to heal our democracy.
Do you agree that the race-based Maori seats undermine the rule of law and democracy in New Zealand?
The Rt Hon Sir Kenneth Keith, 1990, updated 2008
A constitution is about public power, the power of the state. It describes and establishes the major institutions of government, states their principal powers, and regulates the exercise of those powers in a broad way. While all constitutions have these general characteristics, each constitution is affected by the national character of the state it services.
The New Zealand constitution is to be found in formal legal documents, in decisions of the courts, and in practices (some of which are described as conventions). It reflects and establishes that New Zealand is a monarchy, that it has a parliamentary system of government, and that it is a democracy. It increasingly reflects the fact that the Treaty of Waitangi is regarded as a founding document of government in New Zealand. The constitution must also be seen in its international context, because New Zealand governmental institutions must increasingly have regard to international obligations and standards.
The Constitution Act 1986 is the principal formal statement. The Act first recognises that the Queen – the Sovereign in right of New Zealand – is the Head of State of New Zealand, and that the Governor-General appointed by her is her representative in New Zealand. Each can, in general, exercise all the powers of the other.
The Act then deals with the Executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.
The provisions about the Executive emphasise its parliamentary character. Only Members of Parliament may be Ministers of the Crown and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. One Minister may also act for another.
Parliament – the legislature – consists of the Sovereign and the House of Representatives. The members of the House are elected in accordance with theElectoral Act 1993. Each Parliament has a term of three years, unless it is earlier dissolved. The Governor-General has the power to summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament. After each general election, Parliament is to meet within six weeks of the date fixed for the return of the writs.
The Constitution Act provides for Parliament to have full power to make laws; a Bill passed by the House becomes law when the Sovereign or Governor-General assents to it.
The Constitution Act reaffirms the constitutional principles about parliamentary control of public finance: the Crown may not levy taxes, raise loans, or spend public money except by or under an Act of Parliament.
The provisions about the judiciary also relate back to long established constitutional principle. To enhance their independence, the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court are protected against removal from office and reduction of salary.
The other major sources of the constitution include:
Constitutional conventions are of critical importance to the working of the constitution, even though they are not enforceable by the courts. In 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada summarised the constitutional position in that country in an equation: constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the total constitution of the country.
That basic equation and the democratic character of the main conventions appear clearly in relation to the powers of the Queen and Governor-General under the law. Thus they may appoint Ministers and other holders of important offices (such as the Judges, the Defence Chiefs, the Ombudsmen, and the Controller and Auditor-General), they may dismiss them (following certain procedures), they may summon and dissolve Parliaments, they may assent – or not – to Bills passed through the House, and they may agree – or not – to proposed regulations and Orders submitted to them by the Executive Council and Ministers.
The Queen and the Governor-General are free to take those steps as a matter of law. But, as a matter of convention, they do so only on the advice of the Prime Minister or Ministers who have the support of the House of Representatives – that is, on the advice of those who are elected by the New Zealand voters, and who belong to a party which has a majority in the House; or who are part of a coalition which has a majority; or who, as a minority, are accepted by the House as able to sit on the Treasury benches. There must always be a ministry (the government of the day) to advise the Queen or Governor-General.
That convention of course incorporates its own limit – one that conforms with democratic principle. If the government loses the support of the House, or if the Prime Minister loses his or her support as the leader of that government, then the ministry or the Prime Minister is likely to change: another party or combination of parties may now have the support of the House, or a new leader may be identified as Prime Minister. Or the Governor-General may face a more difficult situation because the position within the House or the governing party is unclear.
Situations like this were rare in New Zealand under the first past the post electoral system, but have been less rare since the introduction of the proportional representation electoral system. The essential principle in such situations continues to be that the Queen, as a constitutional monarch, or the Governor-General, as her representative, acts in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister or Ministers who have the necessary support of the House of Representatives. Where that support is unclear, the Governor-General relies on the elected representatives in the House, and especially the party leaders, to clarify whether a party or grouping of parties has the support of the House to govern, or whether fresh elections will be required. In the meantime, the incumbent government continues in office, where necessary acting in accordance with the convention on caretaker government.
This is not to deny the important role of the Governor-General in the business of government. Practice and the Letters Patent indicate that the role includes being informed and consulted, and advising and warning Ministers. The office has central symbolic, unifying, and representative roles, as well as the important legal powers already mentioned.
In a broad sense, it is the ministry or government of the day which governs. The members of the ministry as a whole have the support of the House and must take collective and individual responsibility for their decisions, the decisions that are taken in their name, and the measures they propose. That is the position in law and in convention. That responsibility and power to take decisions results from the electoral process and the political contest.
The decisions often take a legal form that departs from that practical and conventional reality; the decision taken in fact by Cabinet has then to be taken, as a matter of law, by the Governor-General in Council, the Governor-General or a Minister, as the particular statute requires; or the Bill passed by the House through all its readings has to be assented to by the Governor-General to become law. The Cabinet, essentially a body established by convention, has no legal power; and the House acting alone has very limited powers to take decisions with full legal effect.
Political parties provide a vital link between the people, Parliament and the government. The competition for the power of the state, exercised through the House of Representatives and the ministry, is a competition organised by and through political parties. It is party strength in the House after elections that decides who is to govern. It is the parliamentary party or parties with the support of the House (and the ability to ensure supply – the money to fund the state’s functions) that provides the government.
The importance of political parties in our constitutional system is recognised in the Electoral Act 1993 and in Standing Orders. It follows that parties’ internal procedures, for instance in respect of the means of selecting their leaders and members of Cabinet, have an important practical effect on our governmental arrangements. The relationships between parties, including any agreements that they may reach, have become more important under coalition and minority governments.
The Prime Minister is the head of government, chairs Cabinet and has a general coordinating responsibility across all areas of government. By constitutional convention, the Prime Minister alone can advise the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament and call an election, and to appoint, dismiss, or accept the resignation of Ministers.
Ministers constitute the ministry, or executive arm of government. Their powers rise from legislation and the common law (including the prerogative). Ministers are supported in their portfolios by the public service.
The role of the public service is stated in some detail in legislation, particularly in the provisions of the State Sector Act 1988, the Public Finance Act 1989and the Official Information Act 1982, as well as a great number of particular statutes. Constitutional principles and that legislation support four broad propositions (among others). Members of the public service:
Public servants meet those obligations in accordance with important principles such as neutrality and independence, and as members of a career service.
Members of the public service sometimes have independent statutory powers of decision, over which Ministers do not have control and for the exercise of which they are not responsible. Other parts of the broad state sector are also distinct from Ministers and not subject to their control and responsibility in the same way that departments and their members usually are.
The bodies set up separately from government include regulatory agencies, providers of a wide range of services, state trading bodies, and supervisory, control, or advice agencies.
In establishing such bodies, over a very long period, Parliament has recognised and reaffirmed that much public power should not be concentrated. It should be allocated to distinct bodies with varying degrees of independence from the Executive. This separation and independence may help ensure, for instance, a judicial independence of decision, equitable distribution of funds, the pursuit of commercial profit and business efficiency, or effective and credible processes of independent scrutiny, supervision and advice.
Over recent decades the processes of government have become more open. Notably, in 1982 the Official Information Act reversed the basic principle of the Official Secrets Act 1951: the principle now is that official information is to be made available to those seeking it unless there is good reason for withholding it. Those reasons relate to public interest such as the national security and law enforcement, and to private interests such as confidences and privacy. Underlying that principle are a number of purposes, including enabling the more effective participation of the people of New Zealand in the making and administration of laws and policies, and promoting the accountability of Ministers of the Crown and officials, with the consequence of enhancing respect for the law and promoting the good government of New Zealand.
The emphasis on greater transparency in decision making and policy development is also to be seen in the legislation governing the government’s spending and fiscal policies (especially the Public Finance Act 1989), and in the operation of the parliamentary select committee processes.
In a range of ways, including those just indicated, individuals and communities do participate directly in political and governmental processes important to them. There is for instance much emphasis in law and in practice on those exercising public power giving fair hearings to and consulting those affected by the exercise of that power. Also relevant is the enactment of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993.
A balance has to be struck between majority power and minority right, between the sovereignty of the people exercised through Parliament and the rule of the law, and between the right of elected governments to have their policies enacted into law and the protection of fundamental social and constitutional values. The answer cannot always lie with simple majority decision making. Indeed, those with the authority to make majority decisions often themselves recognise that their authority is limited by understandings of what is basic in our society, by convention, by the Treaty of Waitangi, by international obligations and by ideas of fairness and justice.
Major changes in science, technology, communications, trade patterns, financial systems, population movement, the environment and many other matters of international concern mean that more and more law is made through international processes. The powers of national governmental institutions are correspondingly reduced. This has important consequences for national and international constitutional processes. Under changes to parliamentary procedures, Parliament has a greater opportunity to scrutinise and comment on the more significant international treaties before they are ratified by the Executive.
In theory, many parts of the constitution can be amended by legislation passed by a simple majority of the Members of Parliament. That power is, however, restrained by law, convention, practice and public acceptance.
Some limits on constitutional change arise from the international obligations which have just been mentioned.
Certain key elements of the electoral system can be amended only if the people in a referendum approve, or three-quarters of the Members of Parliament agree. The provisions thus protected concern the three-year term of Parliament, the membership of the Representation Commission, the division of New Zealand into general electoral districts, the voting age, and the method of voting. In accordance with that requirement, the amendments made in the last 40 years to those provisions have been made only following agreement between the major political parties in the House or, in the notable instance of the c
hange to proportional representation, following a binding referendum (which had itself been preceded by an indicative referendum).
It also appears to be accepted, at the level of convention, that those voting requirements also apply to any proposal to amend that protective provision. Similarly, Standing Orders provide that an entrenched provision should be introduced by the House only by the vote which would be required for the amendment or repeal of the provision being entrenched. The 1986 Constitution Act itself was enacted with general bipartisan support in the House. And recommendations to the House for new Standing Orders, in accordance with convention, are adopted by consensus in the Standing Orders Committee.
Other constitutional changes arise from legislation enacted in the regular way, such as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, from decisions of the courts, from new prerogative instruments, and from changing practices (which may contribute to new conventions). Some matters are better left to evolving practice rather than being the subject of formal statement. But such development, like other changes to the constitution, should always be based on relevant principle.
Posted on December 3, 2012 by admin in John Minto, Press Releases
MANA is calling on the government to open up to public scrutiny the TPPA (Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement) negotiations which start their 15th round in Auckland today at the Prime Minister’s favourite venue – Sky City Casino.
“We want to see the TPPA abandoned and the clear light of day is the best weapon to expose these secret negotiations between governments and international corporations” says MANA Vice President John Minto.
“The decisions here are too big to be made by just a few right-wing National cabinet ministers – democracy demands community debate and input. It’s an outrage it won’t even be debated in Parliament before our government signs up”.
“What we know about the TPPA so far from various leaks is that it involves the government giving away our sovereignty for some future pie in the sky”.
“Major concerns include:
1. That TPPA is a Bill of Rights for corporate multinationals to plunder the New Zealand economy even more easily than they can at present.
2. It will tightly constrict any future New Zealand government from regulating any area of our economy in the national interest of New Zealanders.
3. Our government will be open to being sued in international tribunals if it regulate in a way which could reduce profits of foreign corporates.
4. It will mean greater expense for us buying drugs, accessing entertainment, etc …
“The negotiations involve 29 chapters – of which only five deal with trade in goods. The others are demand lists from foreign (mainly US) corporates”.
“The capitulation to Warner Brothers over the Hobbit movies is small change compared to what is planned here. Every sector of our economy will be given the Warner Brothers treatment”.
“Prime Minister John Key has shown he doesn’t have the ability to do decent deals for New Zealand. He’s a walkover for any corporate”.
“New Zealand is set to agree to these concessions in the mournful hope we may get future access to US markets for our dairy products. However even if the US agrees to some future access it will take as long to increase dairy exports to the US as it’s taken to get apples into Australia”.
“We are selling our sovereignty for pie in the sky”.
ENDS
For further comment please contact Malcolm Mulholland on 027 765 6380
There are 2 responses to “TPPA Negotiations = Giving Away our Sovereignty for Pie in the Sky”.
– See more at: http://mana.net.nz/2012/12/tppa-negotiations-giving-away-our-sovereignty-for-pie-in-the-sky/#sthash.5Mdi5BiA.dpuf
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JEONG CHUN PHUOC says:
Post Author December 10, 2013 at 3:53 pm
“Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) AND TRADE LIBERALISATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA AS A MEMBER OF ASEAN BLOC”
Malaysia, and other developing countries in ASEAN region, is keen to liberalise trade and intellectual property rights-related inventions to maximise climate change objectives (CC-os) within the Kytoto Protocol and UNFCCC tracks.
The on-going negotiations must take into views SMES’ interests, particularly, the transfer of patents to drive green technologies.
The new MYBIOMASS INITIATIVE by the malaysian government under MIGHT, is a mighty showcase deliverable in the operationalisation of the new TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MECHANISM of UNFCCC as per COP-16 drummed out in Cancun, Mexico in 2010.
It is hoped that the TPPA will consider and incorporate green procurement and transfer of green technologies towards climate change objectives (CC-os) direction and not a dampener for Global Environmental Responsibility Framework in Asia-Pacific region.
……………………… JEONG CHUN PHUOC, EXT CONS, SL, ADV CLI he can be reached at jeongchunphuoc@gmail.com